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Governance and well-being in academia: The negative consequences of 
applying an agency theory logic in higher education 
 
ABSTRACT  
This study examines the relationship between alternative university governance practices and 
staff well-being. Specifically, we investigate how people in academic and professional 
services roles are managed and how various governance mechanisms such as the use of 
performance measures and targets influence their sense of vitality and stress. Drawing from 
agency theory and stewardship theory research, we expected universities to align their 
governance practices to the nature of their employment roles to enhance well-being. Based on 
data collected in the UK, we find that for some academic roles there is a misalignment 
between the responsibilities and job demands and the way institutions govern people in such 
roles, which is shown to affect their well-being. Our results suggest that well-being responses 
to governance mechanisms change depending on the role an employee performs and the 
position he or she occupies. Interestingly, our data suggests that the governance and well-
being experiences of academic leaders are more closely aligned to those of professional 
service leaders than with those of academics without leadership positions. Taken together, our 
investigation notes several shortcomings in the internal governance practices of higher 
education institutions that can have unexpected consequences and require close attention and 
further research. 
KEYWORDS 
Governance, management control systems, performance management, higher education, 
universities, academics, professional services 
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INTRODUCTION 
Management researchers have long recognized that it is beneficial for organizations to align 
their governance practices to the tasks and responsibilities of their employees (Adler and 
Borys, 1996; Adler and Chen, 2011; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Cardinal, 2001; Eisenhardt, 
1985; Frey et al., 2013; Ouchi, 1979; Rousseau, 1978). Scholars have premised this 
contention on the notion that the characteristics of an employee’s work environment (i.e., 
autonomy, task identification, variety and feedback) affect the nature of the employment 
contract, including its obtainability and the stated utility of the desired rewards (Eisenhardt, 
1989). As suggested by Davis et al., (1997), it is necessary for an organization to synchronize 
its governance practices to meet particular conditions of the organization’s employment roles. 
Failure to do so can have wide ranging negative implications for the employee’s relationship 
with their organization (Caldwell et al., 2008; Miller et al., 2002).  
While this notion of governance-employee alignment is endlessly discussed in the 
management literature (Hernandez, 2012), whether this guidance is observed in public 
institutions that have recently transitioned their governance practices to reflect more of a 
‘private sector business-like’ governance approach, such as the case in higher education, is 
uncertain (Kezar and Eckel, 2004). Over the last twenty plus years, reform-minded 
institutions in Western societies have instigated sweeping institutional changes in the way 
universities conduct their internal governance practices (Birnbaum, 2004; Decramer et al., 
2012). This governance reform movement has long advocated for more ‘accountability’ and 
‘transparency’ in public sector investments for higher education (Barry et al., 2001; Burrows, 
2012; Martin, 2012; Zusman, 2005). As a result of these pressures, a series of government 
policies have been implemented in countries such as the UK (Bryson, 2004), the US (Zusman, 
2005), the Netherlands (Schimank, 2005), Finland (Kallio and Kallio, 2014; Kallio et al., 
2016), Australia (Field, 2015), and New Zealand (Waitere et al., 2011).  
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In most countries, these internal governance changes have taken place alongside a 
contentious debate regarding the role of faculty in higher education institutions. Political 
pressure has coerced many institutions to adopt measures that attempt to hold faculty more 
accountable for performance in areas such as teaching and scholarship. For example, over the 
last few decades, the performance of UK faculty has been subject to national evaluation 
exercises that use performance measures and targets (Burrows, 2012; Franco-Santos et al., 
2014; Morrish and Sauntson, 2016; ter Bogt and Scapens, 2012; Townley, 1997; Willmot, 
1995). In the US, the situation is similar. For instance, the Texas A&M Board of Regents 
developed business-like metrics for faculty productivity, reporting how much faculty “made" 
or "lost" for the university by calculating the number of courses taught, student enrolment in 
each course, and the amount of grant dollars awarded (USA Today, 2013). This trend towards 
more measured outcomes across academia has met fierce resistance. From 2012-2013, 
presidents of 12 of the 35 leading public research universities in the United States quit or had 
been fired due to performance-related disputes (USA Today, 2013). However, while such 
governance changes have been perceived as controversial, an increasing number of 
universities worldwide are still adopting ‘business-like’ governance practices that emphasize 
cost-effectiveness and centralized control including hard performance measures, targets and 
appraisals (Deem et al., 2007; McLendon et al., 2006; Milliken and Colohan, 2004; Rhoades 
2005; Sporn, 1999; Toma, 2007).  
As a result of these changes, there has been a polemic debate among academics and 
policy-makers regarding their overall effectiveness (McNay, 2015; Briner, 2015). This type of 
control-oriented governance is argued to better capture individual and department level 
performance compared to collegial-oriented governance practices that historically dominated 
universities (ter Bogt and Scapens, 2012; Deem et al., 2007). As a consequence of these 
mandated governance changes, the traditional collegial approach characterized by a disbursed 
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or horizontal power structure, long-term mission, and an emphasis on self-organizing and 
self-management is being eroded (Birnbaum, 2004; Shore, 2008; Toma, 2007).  
Scholars have begun to question the soundness of this governance transition (e.g., 
Morrish and Sauntson, 2016; Prichard and Willmott, 1997; Townley, 1997; Welpe et al., 
2015; Willmott, 1995). Some have suggested that the stated goal in a corporate setting of 
maximizing shareholder value by meeting hard output measures is vastly different from the 
educational, research, and social fulfilment goals set by universities and their faculty 
(Schmidtlein and Berdahl, 2005). Other scholars contend that employment roles of 
educational faculty are misaligned with the hard performance measurement techniques found 
in control-oriented governance practices (Birnbaum, 2004; Kezar and Eckel, 2004). Our 
research attempts to provide further insight on this phenomenon. Drawing from existing 
governance theories, we investigate the extent to which people in different employment roles 
and positions working for UK universities experience the use of collegial or control 
governance practices, and the extent to which these experiences influence their well-being.  
Considering the institutional pressures that are instigating governance changes in the 
higher education sector, this study facilitates a better understanding of the effects different 
internal governance practices have on the well-being of staff. Our investigation finds several 
shortcomings in the governance practices used by UK universities. In particular, the extent to 
which institutions of higher learning align their governance practices to their different 
employment roles is low. This misalignment appears to be having consequences for the well-
being of staff, in particular of academic staff without leadership responsibilities. This finding 
is critical as staff well-being has been found to relate to increased learning (Duckworth and 
Cara, 2012), innovativeness (Huhtala et al., 2007), creativity (Ohly and Blewdow, 2015), 
helping behaviours (Grant and Kinman, 2014), socially responsible acts (Crilly et al., 2008), 
and productivity (Briner and Dewberry, 2007), all of which are considered drivers of success 
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in education and research environments (Welpe et al., 2015). Therefore, our study provides 
evidentiary information that will hopefully enable further discussion regarding the design and 
implementation of internal governance systems in higher education institutions.  
BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
Internal governance practices 
Originating from the ideological differences concerning the behaviour of man, as actors that 
can either be trusted and nurtured or opportunistic and controlled (Argyris, 1973a; Argyris, 
1973b), there are two theories that are used to explain differences in the governance practices 
within organizations. The first theory is agency theory, which assumes that the two parties 
involved in a working relationship – a principal (e.g., owner or top management) and an agent 
(e.g., employee) – exhibit opportunistic or self-interested behaviours (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). These opportunistic behaviours give rise to the so-called agency 
problem, specifying that each party may have conflicting interests. Agents may focus on 
actions that optimize personal gains to the detriment of organizational goals. Thus, to 
minimize the agency problem inherent in any agency relationship, agency theorists propose 
that the principal should use monitoring (e.g., performance evaluation) and incentive 
mechanisms (e.g., performance related pay) to reduce agents’ opportunistic behaviours, 
increasing their goal alignment (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
These practices have been described as control-oriented governance practices 
(hereafter labelled as ‘control governance’) as they attempt to regulate and control employees’ 
behaviour and performance (Eisenhardt, 1988). Control governance practices are likely to be 
associated with formal levels of hierarchical structures with a clear differentiation of power 
and flows of information (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988). Additionally, 
these practices tend to limit employees’ information freedoms and encourage short-term and 
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financially driven decision-making (Eisenhardt, 1985; Fama, 1980). Agency theorists predict 
that the use of this type of governance approach will be beneficial for principals as well as 
enhance agents’ well-being because it takes into consideration individuals’ preferences 
(Heath, 2009).  
The second theory that is often used to explain internal governance practices is 
stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship theory contrasts with agency theory, as it 
is not concerned with controlling agents. This theory assumes that the interests of the two 
parties are already aligned so incentives and monitoring are not necessary for performance to 
occur (Hernandez, 2012; Tosi et al., 2003). According to stewardship theory, pro-
organizational, collectivistic behaviours have higher utility than self-serving, individualistic 
behaviours (Davis et al., 1997). Therefore, when people act as stewards they strive to protect 
and maximize the principals’ interests by facilitating the delivery of organizational outcomes; 
and, in doing so, they also maximize their own interests and satisfaction. 
Stewardship theory can be associated with collegial-oriented governance practices 
(hereafter labelled as ‘collegial governance’) that complement the notion of ‘clan control’ 
(Ouchi, 1979), including a disbursed power structure that emphasizes high trust, self-control 
and self-management. A collegial governance approach supports such a power structure by 
incorporating governance mechanisms focused on greater employee empowerment and well-
being (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Hernandez, 2012; Segal and Lehrer, 
2012). Thus, elements of a collegial governance approach underscore inclusive and 
collaborative actions rather than ‘top-down’ command and control approaches. Collegial 
governance additionally emphasizes long-term performance defined primarily in non-
financial terms rather than financial, such as pursuing the delivery of “an overarching 
mission, the furtherance of a distinctive concept, or a vision of some idealized future state or 
condition” (Graham and Organ, 1993, p. 490).  
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Internal governance practices and employment roles 
Previous research has prescribed the need for organizations to adapt their governance 
practices to the conditions associated with different employment roles (e.g., Adler and Borys, 
1996; Adler and Chen, 2011; Davis et al., 1997; Eisenhardt, 1985; Frey, et al., 2013; Ouchi, 
1977, 1979; Rousseau, 1978). The nature of employment roles can significantly influence 
both the efficacy of control governance and the organizational commitment and subjugation 
of self-interest associated with collegial governance. The distinctive nature of employment 
roles may be understood in terms of their task characteristics and their position within the 
organization.  
Regarding their task characteristics, at one end of the spectrum are low structured 
roles distinguished by tasks that have low programmability. Eisenhardt (1989) defines 
programmability as “the degree to which appropriate behaviour by the agent can be specified 
in advance” (p. 62). Low structured roles are characterized by work assignments with high 
uncertainty that require operational flexibility and discretion. In these roles, the employee is 
expected to figure out the scope of the work. Job functions with low structured roles often 
encompass specialized tacit knowledge involving shared understanding and high inter-and 
intra-organizational collaboration to successfully complete assignments (Hess and 
Rothaermel, 2011; Turner and Makhija, 2006). Performance in low structured roles is difficult 
to measure and manage due to low observability, greater ambiguity, low outcome 
predictability, and the long-term orientation of these roles (Hernandez, 2012). Consequently, 
the nature of low structured roles tends to invalidate many forms of incentives and monitoring 
that are essential for the viability of control governance practices focused on minimizing 
opportunism and enhancing alignment (Eisenhardt, 1989; Frey et al., 2013; Levinthal, 1988; 
Ouchi, 1979). Therefore, most researchers suggest that using control practices for low 
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structured roles may be inappropriate (Bouillon et al., 2006; Eisenhardt, 1985, 1989; Makri et 
al., 2006) or even dysfunctional (Eisenhardt, 1985, 1989; Frey, Homberg and Osterloh, 2013). 
At the other end of the spectrum are high structured roles involving tasks that are 
highly programmable (Eisenhardt, 1989). Responsibilities in these roles are explicit and 
described in detail (Eisenhardt, 1985). Thereby in this type of roles, appropriate behaviours 
for performing well in a job are codified and specified in advance. An employment role in 
which the nature of the task is well specified tends to produce lower information asymmetries 
(Levinthal, 1988). As such, performance in high structured roles is more easily observable 
and measurable (i.e., it is time-bound and often produces tangible or ‘hard’ outcomes) 
(Eisenhardt, 1988), so control practices such as monitoring and incentives for minimizing 
opportunism are recommended (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Employment roles can also be described in terms of their position. Research often 
highlights the importance and particularities of leadership positions (e.g., Hambrick et al., 
1998). When employees are selected for a leadership position (e.g., CEOs and heads of major 
subunits) the composition of their role changes. Despite their functional background, people 
in these roles become generalists whose main responsibilities involve the management of 
other people’s work. Leadership roles are responsible for setting the goals that mark the 
direction of the organization, as well as accountable for their achievement (Hambrick et al., 
1998; Simon, 1964). Furthermore, leadership roles have the authority to introduce or 
transform internal governance systems and structural forms aimed at facilitating 
organizational success (Hambrick et al., 1998). For example, leadership roles are usually in 
charge of establishing cost reduction programs, quality improvement programs, performance 
appraisals and incentive payments (Yukl, 2008).  
From an agency theory perspective (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), it 
could be argued that leaders behave as principals acting on behalf of their dominant 
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stakeholders when establishing internal governance mechanisms. Despite the apparent 
differences between leadership and non-leadership roles, it is interesting to note that the 
promoters of both agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and 
stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 2012) have not made distinctions 
regarding the most appropriate governance mechanisms for each group. These theories 
assume that their proposed governance practices are appropriate for all employees regardless 
of their position.  
HYPOTHESES 
Employment roles, governance orientation and well-being in higher education 
Educational institutions worldwide are experiencing significant changes in their internal 
governance practices. As noted earlier, whereas a collegial governance approach was 
previously the norm in many institutions, now elements of control governance are firmly 
rooted in universities (Kezar and Eckel, 2004; Morrish and Sauntson, 2016; Welpe et al., 
2015). Among other consequences, this transformation is likely to influence employees’ well-
being (Birnbaum, 2004; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992; Hernandez, 2012). Specifically, 
employees in low structured employment roles, such as those employees involved in research 
and teaching, may perceive this change as dysfunctional or misaligned with their scholarly 
values (Hernandez, 2012).  
Employees in these roles are involved in tasks that require high autonomy, creativity, 
and operate in unstable environments (i.e., low structured roles). Occupants of such roles 
often perform activities under great constraints and face uncertain and highly variable 
performance outcomes. Individuals that perform well in these low structured roles tend to be 
described as highly skilled, knowledgeable, intrinsically driven and passionate for the overall 
mission of the university (Merton, 1996). People in academic roles usually have strong 
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professional identities and values that highlight collaboration, trust, self-governance and 
stewardship (Hernandez, 2012; Kallio et al., 2016). Based on these conditions, academic 
employees may expect governance practices that are informal, flexible and enabling to 
support the nature of their employment role as well as their internalized scholarly values 
(Abernethy and Lillis, 1995; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Rousseau, 1978). Thus, people in 
academic roles may perceive a collegial approach as more appropriate, as it allows them to 
operate with minimal interference, build a trusting relationship with their institution and 
colleagues, and maintain their intrinsic motivation (Hernandez, 2012). Because collegial 
governance practices facilitate the type of tasks performed by people in academic roles and 
are more aligned with traditional academic values, we expect collegial governance practices 
will positively influence the well-being of academics. We therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: For people in academic roles, collegial governance practices will 
be positively related to personal well-being. 
Conversely, when faculty perceives that they are being managed with control 
governance practices, this governance incongruity may engender a negative individual 
sentiment affecting their well-being (Davis et al., 1997). Specifically, previous research 
suggests that control governance practices may mollify intrinsic motivation due to their 
rigidity (Frey et al., 2013; Welpe et al., 2015). Increased rigidity decreases the autonomy and 
flexibility academics perceive as needed to fulfil their role responsibilities; and this reduced 
sense of autonomy and freedom may lead to feelings of dissatisfaction and demotivation, 
creating a lower sense of well-being (Adler and Borys, 1996; Caldwell et al., 2008; Cardinal, 
2001; Deci and Ryan, 2010). Because people in academic roles often perform tasks that have 
low programmability and are strongly socialized into professional values that resemble 
stewardship beliefs, we posit that when they perceive they are being governed under control 
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governance practices, they will express greater negativity. Thus, we suggest the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: For people in academic roles, control governance practices will 
be inversely related to personal well-being. 
While we expect employees in academic roles working in higher education 
institutions to react negatively to control governance practices, we do not anticipate the 
same negative reaction from professional services staff. In universities, professional 
services roles such as secretaries, marketing professionals or registry administrators 
usually involve relatively programmable and observable tasks with performance that 
can be more accurately evaluated and predicted. People performing these roles have not 
experienced the same professional indoctrination and socialization as people in 
academic roles. Many professional services individuals come from private sector 
organizations and are experienced working within formalized control governance 
structures.   
Due to the characteristics of their roles and their backgrounds, professional 
services staff are more likely to respond positively when experiencing control 
governance practices. This could be the case because control governance practices 
provide them with direction, transparency, a more stable and predictable work 
environment, and clear expectations and responsibilities (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hernandez, 
2012). Therefore, because control governance practices provide the appropriate 
direction and extrinsic motivation for staff whose job roles are characterized by 
programmed tasks with low uncertainty, we expect that people in these roles will react 
positively to higher levels of control governance (Eisenhardt, 1989). We thus suggest 
the following hypothesis.  
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Hypothesis 3: For people in professional services roles, control governance 
practices will be positively related to personal well-being. 
Because control governance practices provide a more stable and predictable 
environment in employment relationships with high structured roles, we believe that control 
governance practices will be more suitable for professional services staff than collegial 
governance practices. Adler and Chen (2011) suggest that there are negative implications 
when there is a misalignment between governance systems and certain employee 
characteristics. They argue staff involved in high programmability tasks face strain without a 
formalized environment. Collegial governance can be associated with less formalized 
contexts due to a diminished official power structure, which causes a sense of indeterminate 
expectations and undefined workplace boundaries. Less formalized power structures, such as 
those found in environments with collegial governance practices, can result in low 
authoritative direction, decreased transparency and increased peer evaluations, which can 
cause tension among some employees (Tuomela, 2005). Therefore, as control governance 
practices provide a sense of stability for people in professional services roles with high 
structured tasks, collegial governance practices may not satisfy their needs in the same 
manner, which may lead to less well-being. 
Hypothesis 4: For people in professional services roles, collegial governance 
practices will be less positively related to well-being than control 
governance practices  
The logic of our argument so far suggests that the employment role in terms of task 
structure will have an important effect in how different governance practices relate to staff 
well-being. However, as mentioned earlier, employment roles can also be described in terms 
of their position. Little attention has been paid to the understanding of how the position an 
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employee occupies influences the way in which governance practices are experienced and the 
effect they have on the person’s well-being.  
People in university leadership positions (e.g., Vice-Chancellor, Pro-Vice Chancellors, 
Heads of faculties, schools and departments) are now responsible for setting direction and 
selecting the goals of their institutions (Buckland, 2009). They act on behalf of university 
stakeholders and are expected to define and implement the internal governance practices that 
facilitate the achievement of institutional goals. In recent years, there has been a shift from 
administration and political duties to “management of activity and of strategy” (Buckland, 
2009, p. 531). Professional services leaders and academic leaders are now managing 
individuals and are accountable for performance results (Deem and Brehony, 2005; Deem, 
Hillyard and Reed, 2007). With this sense of accountability comes the need to control and be 
in control (Deem et al., 2007).  
Managerial responsibilities become part of the day-to-day job of most academics 
moving into leadership positions. These management tasks usually overshadow their 
scholarly endeavours and ultimately define their role behaviour. Over time, the needs and 
experiences of academic leaders become more similar to those of professional services leaders 
than to those of their fellow scholars. For them, control practices are likely to be perceived as 
useful and relevant because they provide information and incentives to help encourage the 
performance of others. Nevertheless, due to their backgrounds and fundamental knowledge of 
academic work, they also value the benefits that collegial governance practices can bring. 
Thus, following this logic, we posit that the relationship between both governance practices 
and well-being will be positive for people in leadership positions.  
Hypothesis 5: For people in leadership positions, both collegial and control 
governance practices will be positively related to their personal 
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well-being regardless of the nature of their task structure.  
METHODS 
Research setting, research process and sample selection  
The population for this study consists of staff working in UK universities. Over the last 
decades, the UK university sector has undergone a significant transformation concerning the 
way institutions implement their internal governance practices (Pollitt, 1987). As shown in 
previous research (e.g., Bolden et al., 2012), some universities function in a ‘business-like’ 
way (with a high emphasis on control, accountability and financial efficiency), whilst others 
continue to be run according to the collegial and high-trust traditional academic values 
system. This diversity is particularly important for our research as it provides the variability 
required for the examination of internal governance practices. It must be noted, that the work 
presented here forms part of a larger study involving mix research methods, which aim was to 
explain the governance mechanisms currently being used in UK universities (Authors, 2014). 
The data used in this research has been extracted from the survey of this larger study.  
The survey was conducted in the last three months of 2012. It was addressed to a 
sample frame of 3,650 employees working in the UK’s 162 universities representing 
approximately 1 percent of the population (HESA, 2012). We adopted a stratified random 
sampling process to develop our sample frame. Within each university, we focused on staff 
working for the vice-chancellor’s office and central services (e.g., states, IT), and on staff 
employed at different parts of the institutions. We made special efforts to include people from 
four schools or faculties (management/business, education, math, and performing arts/cultural 
studies) to increase the variability of responses but allow for potential controls according to 
the various disciplines. Information about the individuals included in our sample frame came 
from publicly available data (e.g., names, job titles and email addresses). Some examples of 
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job roles included in our work are: Lecturers, Senior Lecturers, Researchers, Professors, 
Deans or Heads of Schools/Faculty, Pro-Vice Chancellors, Director of Finance, Director of 
HR, and Administrative Support. We sent an email to our sample frame individuals inviting 
them to participate, along with the web-link to our survey. These individuals also received 
two follow-up messages. In total, we received 1,342 survey responses. After cleaning the 
data, we extracted 1,017 usable responses. However, after discarding responses that had 
missing information in key items used in this research, we obtained 975 valid responses (27 
percent response rate). Our responses came from 141 universities, representing 87 percent of 
the overall UK university sector. In Table 1 we present the descriptive information of our 
survey respondents. 
----------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------- 
Measures 
The literature was thoroughly examined to develop survey items capable of measuring our 
constructs: Control governance, collegial governance and employee well-being. We also 
conducted a series of interviews with key informants (mainly academics and senior staff from 
seven different UK universities) to refine the wording of our survey items and ensure their 
relevance and validity in the context of UK universities (Authors, 2014). Table 2 presents the 
items used to measure each of our constructs. 
----------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------- 
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Exogenous variables 
Control governance practices. We created a multi-item scale to measure this construct. We 
examined agency theory research (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Baiman, 1982) and extracted the 
key mechanisms highlighted as essential for aligning the interests of principals and agents at 
the lower levels of an organization. The key mechanisms proposed by agency theorists for the 
governance of organizations are: monitoring through performance measures and targets and 
performance-contingent compensation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Baiman, 1982). Based on these 
insights, we developed a seven-point Likert-type scale assessing the extent to which 
individuals perceived these governance mechanisms were being used in their universities. Our 
scale ranged from 1 “strongly disagree” to 7 “strongly agree”. Table 2 provides the full text, 
description and background literature of the items used and Table 3 presents our descriptive 
statistics. In our Appendix (Table B), detailed information about the validity and reliability of 
this measure is presented. 
Collegial governance practices. To measure this construct, we reviewed previous stewardship 
theory research (e.g., Davis et al., 1997a; Hernandez, 2012; Segal and Lehrer, 2012) and 
extracted suggestions from this literature that pertained to governance mechanisms. 
Stewardship theory suggests governance mechanisms that encourage participation, 
communication, resource provision, recognition of excellence, and continuous learning and 
autonomy. Using previous research conducted on UK universities (e.g., Bolden et al., 2012; 
Franco-Santos et al., 2014; ter Bogt and Scapens, 2012) and a set of interviews with key 
informants, we contextualized these mechanisms and created a seven-point Likert-type scale. 
The scale had six items ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” to 7 “strongly agree”. Table 2 
provides the full text of the items used for this measure and Table 3 the descriptive statistics. 
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In our Appendix (Table B), detailed information about the validity and reliability of this 
measure is presented. 
Employment role. For assessing employment roles, we created four different groups. In our 
survey, we used a categorical variable and every respondent was asked to select the group that 
best reflected his or her role. Our first group represented academic roles without leadership 
responsibilities. This group included traditional scholarly roles such as researchers, lecturers 
and professors without leadership responsibilities. People in these roles are expected to 
deliver highly diverse and abstract goals such as research excellence, education excellence, 
and societal contributions. The fulfilment of these goals involves tasks with a long-term 
orientation, vague or unknown ‘means-ends connections’, high uncertainty and low 
programmability (Campbell, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1988; March and Simon, 1958). Academic 
roles are ‘low structured’ in nature so we used them to designate this variable. In our tables, 
we designate this group using the abbreviation ‘AC’. Our second group was formed by 
professional services roles without leadership responsibilities such as secretaries, registry 
officers, human resource or marketing professionals. People in these roles are expected to 
perform administrative tasks, mainly involving activities that are short-term with a low degree 
of uncertainty and high programmability. These professional services roles were used to 
represent ‘high structured’ roles. In our tables, we designate this group using the abbreviation 
‘PS’. The third and fourth groups in our analysis were formed by university leaders including 
academic leaders (e.g. Vice-Chancellor, Pro-Vice Chancellor and Heads of Schools, Faculties 
and Departments) and professional services leaders (e.g., Finance Director, Directors of 
Professional Services of Schools and Faculties). The group of academic leader roles is 
designated with the abbreviation ‘ACL’ in our tables; in the case of professional services 
leader roles we use ‘PSL’. Our group classification is reflected in Figure 1.  
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----------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------- 
Endogenous variables 
Employee well-being. Previous research has suggested that when assessing well-being, it is 
crucial to include measures of positive as well as negative well-being (e.g., Huppert and 
Whittington, 2003). In our research, we measured well-being in terms of vitality to capture the 
positive aspects of well-being and stress to represent the negative aspects of well-being. 
Vitality has been defined as the sense of being alive, passionate and exited (Spreitzer and 
Porath, 2013). We measured it using a four-item scale extracted from Spreitzer et al., (2005), 
which has already been validated in previous studies (e.g., Porath et al., 2011). This scale 
ranged from 1 “strongly disagree” to 7 “strongly agree” and its full text is presented in Table 
2 (its descriptive statistics appear in Table 3). Stress was assessed with a one-item scale (see 
Table 2 and Table 3) representing negative health. In our Appendix (Table B), detailed 
information about the validity and reliability of this measure is presented. 
Control variables  
When creating our survey, we included a number of demographic and contextual variables to 
control for potential individual and university related characteristics that could influence the 
relationships studied. In terms of individual characteristics, we controlled for respondents’ 
gender (female and male), age and type of employment contract (full-time, part-time) because 
previous research has found these aspects influence people’s perceptions of well-being 
(Diener et al., 1999; Gutierrez et al., 2005; Porath et al., 2011). In terms of university 
characteristics, we controlled for respondents’ university peer group (HESA, 2012). In the 
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UK, university peer groups were created as a way of classifying institutions for policy-making 
decisions. This classification criteria are mainly associated with their founding sources (e.g., 
research, teaching, special activities). Our interviews with key informants highlighted that 
some of these variables, including the primary source of funding (research or teaching), could 
significantly influence the governance mechanisms used and staff well-being. Prior to 
conducting our survey, we did not hypothesize about how any of these controls could affect 
our studied relationships.  
Data analysis 
Our survey data was analysed using Structural Equation Modelling (SEM). SEM is a second-
generation multivariate method that enables the simultaneous analysis of observed and latent 
variables (Jöreskog, 1993). Alternative multivariate statistics methods such as regression 
analysis (Cohen et al., 2002) were considered. However, SEM was deemed more appropriate 
for this research because some of the assumptions required for regression analysis were not 
met; and because SEM allows the identification of potential interaction effects through multi-
group analysis (Bollen, 1989; Jöreskog, 1971). Additionally, SEM permits the simultaneous 
evaluation of all the variables in the model rather than separately and sequentially. It also 
provides measurement errors without aggregating them in a residual error term (Fornell, 
1984). In this research, we used MPLUS 7.11 (Muthen and Muthen, 1998-2012) and EQS 6.2 
(Bentler, 1995-2008) to estimate our SEM models. All the variables in our research were 
assessed using a seven-item Likert scale and individual responses were associated with the 
university they belonged to. In our analysis, the assumptions of normality and independence 
were not met (Muthen and Satorra, 1995; Rivera and Satorra, 2002; Satorra and Bentler, 
1994; Satorra, 1992, 2003). As a result, the general estimation method we used was MLR 
(maximum likelihood parameter estimates with standard errors and a chi-square test statistic 
that are robust to non-normality and non-independence of observation) (Muthen and Muthen, 
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1998-2012). We adopted the robust Chi-square, RMSEA, SRMR and CFI indexes as 
indicators of model fit (Bollen, 1989; Browne and Cudeck, 1993; Hair et al., 2006; Hu and 
Bentler, 1999).  
Before proceeding to test our hypotheses, we conducted a set of preliminary data 
analyses to investigate the quality of our measures and the nature of the main relationships 
studied. For the sake of simplicity and completeness, we have included the results of these 
analyses in the Appendix. For these preliminary analyses, we first calculated the descriptive 
statistics of the items in our measures and conducted ANOVA and Duncan tests comparing 
the responses of our different employment roles (Appendix-Table A). The purpose of this 
analyses was to examine the extent to which responses were significantly different across the 
employment roles studied. Next, we used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to examine the 
dimensional structure of the theoretical constructs involved in our hypotheses. We conducted 
CFA for our total sample and across the different employment roles sub-samples (Appendix-
Table B). The main relationship presented in our hypotheses suggests that the orientation of 
the governance practices used is related to the degree of well-being experienced by university 
staff. Therefore, before testing our moderating hypotheses, we analysed the extent to which 
this main relationship exists for the total sample including our control variables, the different 
employment roles and the two types of governance practices. In the Appendix, Table C shows 
the results of these analyses.  
RESULTS 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of all our observed 
variables. Table 4 shows the results of our different structural models. As it is common in 
regression analysis, we present the standardized coefficients showing direct effects between 
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the variables studied. Given the goodness-of-fit statistics for structural equation models, these 
models fit the data reasonably well as shown in Table 4.  
----------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 1 proposes that collegial governance practices will be positively related to 
the well-being of people in academic roles (without leadership responsibilities). Our model 
suggests (Table 4) that this is the case for the academic roles investigated. When people in 
academic roles experience collegial practices they also experience high levels of vitality or 
positive well-being (βACCollegial→PW = .53, p<.01)
2
 and low levels of stress or negative well-
being (βACCollegial→NW= -.36, p<.01). Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported by our data. 
Hypothesis 2 posits that control governance practices will be negatively related to the 
well-being of people in academic roles (referring to those academics without leadership 
responsibilities). Our data analysis shows (Table 4) that this relationship is partially 
supported. We find that when people in academic roles perceive the use of control governance 
practices, this perception is positively related to their stress levels. That is, those that 
experience high levels of control governance also experience high levels of negative well-
                                                 
 
2
 We have included within parentheses the standardized coefficients (β) resulting from our analysis and their 
significance level (p value) to facilitate comprehension. The β superscript indicates the employment role and its 
subscript indicates the path. For example, in (βAC Collegial→PW = .53, p<.01), AC refers to Academics without 
leadership responsibilities, Collegial  PW refers to the relationship between collegial governance and positive 
well-being (vitality), and p<.01 means that the likelihood that the phenomena tested occurred by chance alone is 
less than 1 percent. 
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being (βACControl→NW= .10, p<.05). However, the effect of control governance practices on 
vitality (positive well-being) is not statistically significant (βACControl→PW= .04, p>.10). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is partially supported.  
Hypothesis 3 postulates that people in professional services roles (without leadership 
responsibilities) will experience positive well-being when they perceive the use of control 
governance practices. Our data show (Table 4) that when people in these roles experience 
control governance practices, they appear to feel better in terms of high vitality and low stress 
levels (βPSControl→PW= .36, p<.01; β
PS
Control→NW= -.15, p<.01). These results suggest that 
Hypothesis 3 is supported by the data. 
Hypothesis 4 highlighted that people in professional services roles (without leadership 
responsibilities) will perceive lower levels of well-being when they experience collegial 
governance practices than when they experience control practices. Our models suggest (Table 
4) that perceptions of collegial practices are positively related to the well-being of people in 
professional services roles (βPSCollegial→PW= .57, p<.01 and β
PS
Collegial→NW= -.36, p<.01). This 
relationship is stronger than the relationship obtained between perceptions of control 
governance practices and well-being. Therefore, our Hypothesis 4 is not supported by our 
data. 
Finally, Hypotheses 5 proposes that people in leadership positions (academic and 
professional services) will feel good about the use of both control and collegial governance 
practices. For academic leaders, our models show (Table 4) that both control and collegial 
governance mechanisms are associated with a high sense of vitality (βACLControl→PW= .31, 
p<.01; βACLCollegial→PW= .61, p<.01). This part of the hypothesis is statistically supported.  
However, the relationship between governance practices and stress is less clear. When 
academic leaders experience high collegial governance practices they also experience low 
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stress levels (βACLCollegial→NW= -.23, p<.01) but the relationship between control governance 
and stress levels is not statistically significant. Further, the positive relationship between 
perceived collegial practices and well-being is stronger than the relationship between 
perceived control practices and well-being. For professional services leaders, collegial 
practices appear to positively affect well-being in terms of vitality (βPMLCollegial→PW= .47, 
p<.01). The rest of relationships for this group are not statistically significant. In sum, our 
Hypothesis 5 is partially supported by the data. 
----------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION 
Our analysis of the governance practices in universities reveals several interesting findings 
that have implications for management and higher education research. Based on previous 
literature (e.g., Adler and Chen, 2011; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Davis et al., 1997; 
Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979; Rousseau, 1978), we expected universities to align their 
governance practices to the nature of their employees’ roles to enhance their well-being. We 
examined these relationships by looking at the extent to which the association between 
university governance practices and well-being was affected by the conditions of different 
employment roles using agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) and 
stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997; Hernandez, 2012) knowledge. 
We find that the adoption of collegial governance practices underlined by stewardship theory 
research is beneficial for the well-being of staff regardless of their role. Perceptions of these 
practices are associated with high levels of vitality and low levels of stress. Control 
governance practices, which correspond to the framing of agency theory, appear to be 
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beneficial to the well-being of people in academic leadership positions and professional 
services staff. However, they appear to be detrimental for faculty without leadership 
responsibilities. Our findings provide empirical support to Davis’ et al. (1997) research, 
which conceptually asserts that an alignment or misalignment between the nature of the 
employment relationship and the governance orientation will fulfill or fail to satisfy the 
motivational dispositions of staff.  
We also find that the governance experiences and sense of well-being of academic 
leaders are more closely aligned with those of professional services leaders than with those of 
academics without leadership positions. As expected, despite their scholarly backgrounds, 
people in academic leadership roles do not seem to experience the negative effects of control 
governance practices that other academics feel. When academics ascend to leadership 
positions, it appears that the needs and expectations of the role position change their outlook 
and sentiment towards governance. This finding is in accordance with previous research 
suggesting that the constraints of a role become part of the decision-making ‘program’ 
defining the behaviour of the role-holder (Simon, 1964). Such that, the pressing needs for 
accountability and measurable outcomes required for external validation and legitimacy may 
become the focus of attention of academic leaders affecting their perceptions of governance 
practices and well-being.  
Implications for theory and future research  
Our research shows that the premises of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Eisenhardt, 1989) and stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997; 
Hernandez, 2012), which are often seen as contradictory, can co-exists within single 
organizations, resulting in the adoption of both control and collegial governance mechanisms. 
Our data show that people in the various roles examined, experience both control and 
collegial governance practices in their universities. Further research could explore the extent 
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to which these governance practices can be complementary as well as the conditions 
favouring or hindering that complementarity. In addition to this, further work could examine 
the extent to which this observed co-existence is transitory or may be permanent.  
Our study offers a deeper understanding of the congruency theoretical propositions 
presented by Davis et al. (1997) in a non-for-profit sector. Davis and colleagues (1997) argue 
that specific situations produce individual preferences towards either control or collegial 
governance practices; and that the congruence between individual preferences and governance 
practices will influence individuals’ well-being. In line with these ideas, our data suggests that 
the alignment between governance practices and employment roles in universities is 
associated with well-being perceptions. We have focused on employment roles as a way to 
designate individual preferences (Simon, 1964); however, in order to examine the extent to 
which different preferences and motivations influence the experience of certain governance 
practices, additional research could account for these individual differences. 
Implications for management practice 
Our findings are especially important for educational institutions and other innovation-
focused organizations with a high volume of knowledge workers (i.e., low structured roles). 
In universities, low structured roles that include faculty research and teaching positions make 
up a large portion of the employment population and likewise help fulfill an overarching 
social, economic, environmental and cultural mission. Evidence from this study adds to the 
growing chorus of scholars that assert universities are mismanaging private sector-inspired 
reforms (Briner, 2015; Burrows, 2012; Kallio et al., 2016; McNay, 2015; Prichard and 
Wilmott, 1997; Toma, 2007; Willmott, 1995). Specifically, considering the importance of 
well-being for individual and institutional results, our data suggests that the current transition 
towards enhanced control governance with increasing reliance on hard performance measures 
and targets for academics, (e.g., Diamond, 2015) may lead to dysfunctionalities rather than 
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the intended improvements (Bryson, Forth and Stokes, 2014). UK data from the Higher 
Education sector is already showing that the overall well-being of people in academic roles is 
being eroded (Kinman and Court, 2010; Kinman and Wray, 2015). As shown here, a critical 
explanatory factor may be the control governance practices used by universities. 
Furthermore, our research shows that collegial governance practices are associated 
with high levels of well-being not just for people performing educational and research duties 
but also for people in professional services roles. Previous research has shown that increased 
well-being is associated with enhanced performance at work (Bryson et al., 2014) even more 
so for academic related undertakings (e.g., Briner and Dewberry, 2007). Our findings suggest 
that for university employees stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997) may be a more effective 
governance philosophy than agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Indeed, stewardship theorists often use people in academic roles as exemplars of ‘stewards’ 
(e.g., Hernandez, 2012). Our work suggests that universities could benefit from paying more 
attention to the conditions that people in academic roles need to produce excellent education 
and research. This recommendation resonates with the views of recent Nobel laureates such as 
Peter Higgs who has raised his concerns and argued that his discoveries would have not been 
possible now “as academics are expected to keep churning out papers [to meet specific 
research targets]” (e.g., Aitkenhead, 2013). 
 Some scholars argue that the move towards control governance practices appears to be 
associated with a particular ideology coupled with legitimacy and funding pressures (Parker 
and Jary, 1995; Willmott, 1995; Deem and Brehony, 2005; Deem, Hillyard and Reed, 2007; 
Diamond, 2015). This move seems to be ignoring or not fully considering the individual 
motives and working conditions required for the well-being and performance of university 
staff, in particular, of people in academic roles without leadership responsibilities. This move 
also appears to be driven by what Merton (1936, p. 901) calls the “imperious immediacy of 
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interest” as university leaders become concerned with the immediate consequences of visible 
performance outputs (e.g., rankings, national research assessments) excluding the 
considerations of the future impact of increased control.  
Drawing from Merton (1936), these circumstances may be conducive to unintended 
undesirable consequences as it could be speculated that a “self-fulfilling prophecy” may occur 
(Merton, 1948; Ferraro et al., 2005) with unknown results for science (Welpe et al., 2015) and 
the public mission of universities (Calhoum, 2011; Ortega y Gasset, 1944). Meaning that, 
people going into academia are often motivated to contribute to knowledge and to high 
quality education (Hernandez, 2012; Merton, 1996), aspects that constitute the overall mission 
of most public universities. However, as agency theory suggests, the use of control 
governance mechanisms will affect people’s behaviour. Over time, the observed negative 
well-being effects, together with the well-known motivation and sorting effects of control 
mechanisms (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010), may alter people’s motivation and interests as 
well as attract new people with the characteristics presumed by the theory. This generally may 
make agency theory in this context self-fulfilling (Ferraro et al., 2009; Goshal, 2005) and the 
stewardship behaviours and motivation needed to significantly contribute to education and 
research less evident (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Frey, Homberg and Osterloh, 2013). 
Limitations 
Our research has several limitations that we should note. Firstly, a limitation of the study is 
the grouping of employment roles into a reduced set of categories. For instance, within 
academic roles there are significant differences between, for example, a researcher and an 
associate professor. Although this procedure was done for ease of analysis, and indeed the 
groups did show communalities, by not analysing employment roles separately, there is a 
possibility that some employment roles are treated differently. Future research could group 
academic roles into those that are more teaching or research oriented as well as those that 
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come from different disciplines. Roles could also be grouped according to seniority and tasks 
characteristics. It could also be revealing to distinguish between the short-term or long-term 
nature of different employment roles. For instance, the views of academic leaders in short-
term appointments expecting to return to their normal academic role may differ from those of 
academic leaders who are permanently in a leadership role. The temporality of contracts (e.g., 
permanent vs. temporary staff) may also influence the relationships observed in this research 
as previous work in the sector has already shown (Fontinha, Van Laar and Easton, 2016). 
Then again, the current grouping of employment roles meets the purpose of our research, 
which was to focus on the moderating effect that two specific task characteristics (low and 
high structured) and two different role positions (with and without leadership responsibilities) 
can have on the relationship between governance practices and well-being. Further research 
could create alternative employment groups to gain greater granularity. 
  Secondly, our survey questions do not specify the organizational level at which the 
employee perceives collegial or control governance practices. Multilevel research would need 
to be conducted where responses to questions about the department, school or faculty, and 
university governance approaches are compared. As universities usually feature multiple 
layers of management, employees might experience more of a collegial practice at the 
department level and more of a control practice at the school/faculty level. Therefore, by not 
capturing this data, we are unable to identify the source of the perceived governance practice. 
Although, such information is important in understanding the specific origin of disagreement 
that leads to the perception of alignment or a misalignment of a governance practice. Because 
this study does not seek to reveal the origin of the disagreement, only if it was perceived at 
the individual level, we believe this assessment is outside the scope of this study. However, 
the above mentioned multilevel data collection would be useful in future research.  
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Finally, in our work, we have not considered alternative theoretical perspectives that 
can contribute to elucidate our results
3
. For example, the well-being response of academic 
leaders could be explained by the insights of previous identity research (Winter, 2009; Lok, 
2010) conducted in environments with shifting logics, such as the UK university environment 
(Townley, 1997). It may be the case that some faculty are more likely to embrace current 
leadership roles emphasising ‘calculative’ or ‘business-like’ discourses as they appeal to their 
individual preferences (e.g., more extrinsic drives) using them to shape their identities, which 
then become more similar to those of professional leaders. Others resist this ‘managerial’ 
identity and prefer to remain in their traditional academic one (Mcgivern et al., 2015). In 
general, we know little about the conditions under which academics take leadership roles, 
how the roles influence their identity, and how these aspects influence governance and well-
being perceptions. Another relevant perspective could be the analysis of how perceptions of 
justice (e.g., Greenberg, 2004) from different roles may be related to the implementation of 
different governance practices and how these perceptions may affect people’s well-being. 
These are areas that could benefit from further research. 
CONCLUSION  
This study indicates that, in the context of universities, the relationship between governance 
practices and well-being is affected by the role a person occupies. Despite the background and 
experience and individual might possess, governance practices are not always facilitated to 
meet the role demands of all employees in higher education institutions. We consequently 
show that well-being among academic faculty, who are vital to higher education institutions, 
                                                 
 
3
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for these insights. 
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is influenced by a congruence or incongruence with the type of internal governance practiced. 
We also show that academics in leadership positions do not experience governance practices 
in the same way as their fellow academics. Instead, they respond to governance practices in 
the same manner that professional services leaders do. In conclusion, our study lends support 
to critics that have claimed that the introduction of “business-minded governance practices” in 
higher education is being mismanaged (Briner, 2015, p.1) and may have unintended 
undesirable consequences in the long run.  
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FIGURE 1: Employment roles 
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TABLE 1: Sample description 
Variables  N % 
Respondents’ role   
Academic  
(e.g., Professor, Reader, Senior Lecturer, Senior Researcher, Lecturer, Researcher) 
573 58.8 
Academic leader  
(e.g., Vice Chancellor, Pro-Vice Chancellor, Head of Faculty/School/Department)  
136 13.9 
Professionals services manager and Support  
(e.g., Head of Training and Development, Head of Student Affairs, Head of 
Planning and Policy, Personal Assistant, Secretary, Administrative, Technician, 
Officer) 
202 20.7 
Professional services leader 
(e.g., Registrar, Director of Finance, Director of Human Resources) 
64 6.6 
Respondents’ gender   
Male 462 47.4 
Female 513 52.6 
Respondents’ age   
Less than 35  92 9.3 
36-45  209 21.5 
46-55 390 40.0 
56-65 267 27.4 
More than 66 17 1.7 
Respondents’ employment contract   
Full time 853 87.5 
Part time 122 12.5 
Respondents’ university peer group   
PG_A: Russell group (excluding LSE) 210 21.5 
PG_B: All other institutions with research income of 22% or more of total 168 17.2 
PG_C: Institutions with research income 8-21% of total 86 8.8 
PG_D: Institutions with research income 5 -8% of total and total income >£120m 268 27.5 
PG_E: Teaching institutions with a turnover of £40m and £119m 103 10.6 
PG_F: Smaller teaching institutions 114 11.7 
PG_G: Specialist music/arts teaching institutions 26 2.7 
Total sample = 975. 
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TABLE 2: Constructs and measurement scales 
Constructs Description Scale items 
Control governance  
Eisenhardt (1989), 
Baiman (1982), 
Bolden et al. (2012), 
ter Bogt and Scapens 
(2012); Hernandez 
(2012) 
Governance based on 
monitoring (performance 
measurement, targets) and 
performance-contingent 
rewards 
CON1 My institution uses specific performance 
indicators to monitor performance 
CON2 My institution sets specific performance targets 
to differentiate good and bad performance 
CON3 In my institution, rewards are based on 
whether you meet the objectives set by 
supervisors  
CON4 My institution monitors what people do and 
don't do 
Collegial governance  
Davis et al. (1997a), 
Hernandez (2012), 
Segal and Lehrer 
(2012) 
Governance based on high 
participation, 
communication, resource 
provision, recognition of 
excellence, continuous 
learning and autonomy 
COL1 My institution develops its strategic plans 
following a thorough consultation process 
COL2 My institution is effective at communicating 
how the work of individuals and teams 
contributes to its overall success 
COL3 My institution provides us with the necessary 
resources to do our work well 
COL4 My institution equally promotes and recognizes 
excellence in whatever shape or form it comes 
(e.g., teaching, research, 
management/administration) 
COL5 My institution provides constant opportunities 
for learning and development 
COL6 In my institution staff have a lot of autonomy to 
choose how they meet their output goals in 
whatever way they think is best 
Employee well-being 
Spreitzer and Porath 
(2013), Spreitzer et 
al. (2005) 
Positive well-being as sense 
of vitality or aliveness 
(associated with positive 
health)  
PWB1 I feel alive and vital at work 
PWB2 I have energy and spirit at work 
PWB3 I feel alert and awake at work 
PWB4 I am looking forward to each new day at work 
Negative well-being as 
stress (associated with 
negative health) 
NWB1 I feel stressed at work 
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TABLE 3: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
 Mean Sd. 
Correlation Matrix 
 CON1 CON2 CON3 CON4 COL1 COL2 COL3 COL4 COL5 COL6 PWB1 PWB2 PWB3 PWB4 NWB1 
Control Governance                  
CON1 My institution uses specific 
performance indicators to monitor 
performance 
4.81 1.63 
               
CON2 My institution sets specific 
performance targets to differentiate 
good and bad performance 
4.36 1.71 .71*** 
              
CON3 In my institution, rewards are 
based on whether you meet the 
objectives set by supervisors  
3.71 1.69 .29*** .35*** 
             
CON4 My institution monitors what 
people do and don't do 
4.41 1.75 .21*** .28*** .23*** 
            
Collegial Governance                  
COL1 My institution develops its strategic 
plans following a thorough 
consultation process 
3.64 1.97 .35*** .28*** .24*** -.03 
           
COL2 My institution is effective at 
communicating how the work of 
individuals and teams contributes 
to its overall success 
3.18 1.68 .37*** .33*** .30*** .06* .64*** 
          
COL3 My institution provides us with the 
necessary resources to do our work 
well 
3.45 1.78 .27*** .25*** .24*** -.05 .62*** .63*** 
         
COL4 My institution equally promotes 
and recognizes excellence in 
whatever shape or form it comes 
(e.g., teaching, research, 
management/administration) 
3.32 1.85 .29*** .27*** .27*** -.04 .63*** .71*** .67*** 
        
COL5 My institution provides constant 
opportunities for learning and 
development 
4.33 1.72 .31*** .25*** .21*** .02 .55*** .54*** .58*** .57*** 
       
COL6 In my institution staff have a lot of 
autonomy to choose how they meet 
their output goals in whatever way 
they think is best 
3.99 1.68 .08** .03 .02 -.15*** .45*** .37*** .46*** .40*** .37*** 
      
Positive Well-being                  
PWB1 I feel alive and vital at work 4.22 1.87 .25*** .19*** .19*** -.05 .43*** .42*** .45*** .47*** .45*** .34*** 
     
PWB2 I have energy and spirit at work 4.52 1.80 .25*** .17*** .16*** -.04 .42*** .40*** .43*** .43*** .44*** .31*** .86*** 
    
PWB3 I feel alert and awake at work 4.79 1.60 .22*** .15*** .16*** -.01 .34*** .32*** .37*** .36*** .37*** .25*** .70*** .74*** 
   
PWB4 
I am looking forward to each new 
day at work 
3.89 1.86 .19*** .14*** .15*** -.04 .44*** .42*** .46*** .44*** .43*** .34*** .75*** .75*** .64*** 
  
Negative Well-being                  
NWB1 I feel stressed at work 4.82 1.71 -.07** -.03 -.06* .09** -.31*** -.28*** -.37*** -.30*** -.26*** -.23*** -.32*** -.34*** -.27*** -.41*** 
 
*** p < .001; ** p < .05; * p < .10 
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TABLE 4: Governance practices and well-being across groups of employment roles 
Direct Effects 
Academic 
(βAC) 
Academic 
Leader 
(βACL) 
Professional 
Services 
(βPS) 
Professional 
Services 
Leader 
(βPSL) 
Differences 
Control governance→ positive 
well-being  
 
.04 
.31*** 
(.23, .39) 
.36*** 
(.28, .44) 
.14 
βAC = βPSL = 0 
βACL = βPS  > 0  
Control governance→ negative 
well-being 
.10** 
(.02, .18) 
.01 
-.15*** 
(-.23, -.07) 
.03 
βACL = βPSL = 0 
βAC >0  /  βPS <0  
Collegial governance→ positive 
well-being  
 
.53*** 
(.45, .61) 
.61*** 
(.53, .69) 
.57*** 
(.49, .65) 
.47*** 
(.35, .59) 
βAC = βPS = βACL > 0  
 βPSL = βAC = βPS > 0 
βACL ≠ βPSL  
Collegial governance→ negative 
well-being  
 
-.36*** 
(-.44, -.28) 
-.23*** 
(-.31, -.15) 
-.36*** 
(-.44, -.28) 
-.11 
βPSL = 0  
βACL  < βAC =  βPS < 0 
R
2
 Positive well-being  .29 .10/.37 .12/.33 .02/.22  
R
2
 Negative well-being .12 .00/.07 .02/.13 .02/.01  
β: Standardized coefficients  
*** p < .001; ** p < .05; * p < .10. 
R
2
 Control Governance / R
2
 Collegial Governance 
AC: Academic, χ2 [49]= 111.0, RMSEA= .05, SRMR= .03 and CFI= .98.  
ACL: Academic Leader, χ2 [12]= 24.9, RMSEA= .07, SRMR= .04 and CFI= .96/χ2 [33]= 38.4, RMSEA= .04, SRMR= .04 and CFI= .99.  
PS: Professional Services, χ2 [12]= 25.6, RMSEA= .08, SRMR= .03 and CFI= .98/χ2 [33]= 68.5, RMSEA= .07, SRMR= .05 and CFI= .97.  
PSL: Professional Services Leader: χ2 [12]= 17.2, RMSEA= .08, SRMR= .05 and CFI= .99/χ2 [33]= 33.2, RMSEA= .08, SRMR= .06 and CFI= .98. 
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APPENDIX 
In this appendix we present the actions we took to prevent potential biases and the preliminary 
analyses conducted before testing our hypotheses. Our preliminary analyses include our descriptive 
statistics together with our measurement and structural models. 
 
Controlling for biases 
During the research design phase, we considered ex-ante remedies to prevent potential bias in our 
data analysis (Chang et al., 2010; Podsakoff, et al., 2012). Firstly, we conducted a pilot survey to 
validate and test our measures in one UK university. After receiving verbal and written feedback 
from respondents, we reviewed and polished some of the items in our measures. Secondly, we 
focused our survey on staff working in UK universities and we gathered our data using an on-line 
survey. We gave our survey participants the opportunity to respond anonymously to the 
questionnaire. We also reassured them about the confidentiality of the data. Participants were made 
aware of the fact that the survey data was for research purposes only rather than commercial or 
political. These ex-ante remedies are needed to reduce problems in the comprehension phase of the 
survey process; however, they are not sufficient to enable us to completely avoid potential selection 
and common method biases (Chang et al., 2010). Hence, we applied ex-post statistical control 
strategies to test for selection and common method biases. Regarding selection bias, following 
Armstrong and Overton (1977) we compared early and late respondents of the questionnaire in the 
observed variables. The statistical tests for differences between means were not significant at 0.05, 
which suggests that selection bias was not a serious problem in this research. To control for 
common method variance (CMV), we used Harman’s single-factor test. All the observed variables 
were subjected to principal components analysis, and the first un-rotated component explains less 
than 40 percent of the variance. Furthermore, we estimated a single-factor confirmatory model. This 
model had a bad fit (2[90]= 2776.72, RMSEA=.18, SRMR=.12 and CFI= .58). Consequently, no 
single factor can explain the data structure. Based on the results of the Harman single-factor test, the 
goodness of fit of the single-factor confirmatory model and the proposed theoretical model we do 
not expect common method variance to be a serious problem in our research. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table A presents the descriptive statistics of the observed variables of our constructs across the 
different respondents’ roles, using the analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Duncan’s multiple-range 
test. The purpose of our ANOVA and Duncan’s test was to examine the extent to which responses 
were significantly different across our different groups of employment. We find that within the 
control governance construct the use of specific performance metrics and monitoring was 
consistently rated high across all respondent groups. It must be noted that people in leadership roles 
indicated slightly higher levels of the use of performance metrics than the academic and 
professional services roles. Within the collegial governance construct respondents consistently rated 
that their institution provided lowers levels of communication, resource provision, developmental 
support, and recognition of excellence. Autonomy (COL6) was the highest rated item of the 
collegial governance measure and it rated fairly high across the different groups. Moreover, people 
in academic roles perceived slightly lower levels of collegial governance compared with people in 
professional services roles and leadership roles. Positive well-being was shown to be similar 
between people in academic and professional services roles and slightly higher among people in 
leadership roles. However, negative well-being was shown to be notably higher among people in 
academic roles as compared with the well-being experienced by people in professional services and 
leadership roles. This data provides preliminary evidence supporting the moderating effect that 
employment role has on the relationship between governance practices and well-being. People in 
different roles perceive the existence of control and collegial governance practices. However, they 
perceive these practices in different levels with distinctive consequences for their well-being.  
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Measurement model 
We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to examine the dimensional structure of the theoretical 
constructs involved in our hypotheses. We conducted CFA for our total sample and across the 
different groups of employment roles. In order to assess our measurement model, we followed the 
approach suggested by Bagozzi (2010). We analyzed the reliability of our constructs, together with 
their convergent and discriminant validity. The reliability of the observed variables was evaluated 
with the standardized factor loadings of the indicators for each construct and their reliability 
coefficients. We used three coefficients to measure the precision for each of our measures: the 
cronbach's alpha coefficient (α), the composite reliability coefficient (CRC), and the average 
variance extracted (AVE). The recommended values for α and CRC are above .70 and for AVE is 
above .50 (Bagozzi, 2010). With a given model of measurement, the parameters of interest for the 
evaluation of discriminant validity of the constructs are the AVE coefficients and the estimation of 
the squared correlations among these constructs. These parameters are analyzed to determine 
whether 1 lies inside all the confidence intervals around the correlation estimate between any two 
factors. Furthermore, from the size of the correlations between the factors of the first order, we 
evaluated if there were a second-order factor involved in our data (Bagozzi, 2010). 
 
In order to evaluate the dimensional structure of our constructs, we estimated a first-order four-
factor model across the total sample of responses and each of our employment roles (see Table B: 
Complete Measurement Model). In the total sample, given the goodness-of-fit statistics of this 
model, we could not refuse it (Total Sample: 2 [85]= 349.3, RMSEA= .06, SRMR= .06, CFI= 
.96); however, the data showed that two items from the control governance scale (CON3 and 
CON4) and one from the collegial governance scale (COL6) present reliability issues. For 
conducting our multi-group confirmatory factor analysis, we estimate a first order four-factor model 
across the four groups of employment roles. The goodness-of-fit statistics show that these models 
fit the data reasonably well (Academic: 2 [85]= 219.5, RMSEA= .05, SRMR= .06, CFI= .96; 
Academic Leader: 2 [85]= 127,9, RMSEA= .06, SRMR= .07, CFI= .95; Professional Services: 2 
[85]= 194.8, RMSEA= .08, SRMR= .06, CFI= .93; and Professional Services Leader: 2 [85]= 
140.3, RMSEA= .10, SRMR= .09, CFI= .87). The results of CON3 and CON4 were not surprising 
taking into consideration the context of our research and the fact that there is great variability in the 
extent to which UK universities have implemented incentive rewards and individual performance 
monitoring (Diamond, 2015). Because of these results, we decided to remove these items and obtain 
a better representation of reality in terms of reliability and convergent validity, without affecting the 
scales’ predictive validity. 
 
After refining our measurement scales, we conducted another first-order four-factor model (see 
Table B: Reduced Measurement Model). This new measurement model fits the data reasonable well 
(Total Sample: 2 [49]= 164.4, RMSEA= .05, SRMR= .03, CFI= .98; Academic: 2 [49]= 111.0, 
RMSEA= .05, SRMR= .03, CFI= .98; Academic Leader: 2 [49]= 56.7, RMSEA= .03, SRMR= 
.04, CFI= .99; Professional Services: 2 [49]= 117.9, RMSEA= .08, SRMR= .05, CFI= .95 and 
Professional Services Leader: 2 [49]= 52.7, RMSEA= .03, SRMR= .07, CFI= .98). Table B also 
shows that the standardized parameter estimates and the reliability coefficients obtained are 
evidence of the reliability and convergent validity of our factors. With regard to evaluating 
discriminant validity, the AVEs are above the squared correlation among the latent variables and 
furthermore 1 is not within the confidence intervals around the correlation estimate between the 
factors. 
 
It is important to note that we detected that in the Academic Leader, Professional Services and 
Professional Services Leader groups the correlations among the exogenous latent variables (control 
and collegial governance) are above .70 (ACL= .73; PSMS= .71; and PSL= .70), while in the total 
sample and in the Academic group these correlations are below .45 (TS= .44 and AC= .22). Such 
 
46 
high correlations reveal the potential existence of a second order factor (Governance Practices) with 
two first-order latent variables (control and collegial governance). Thus, we estimated a new model, 
that is a second-order confirmatory factor model, with the equivalent latent variables 
(ControlGO=CollegialGO). This model is equivalent to the first-order four-factor model; it has the same 
goodness of fit. The parameter estimated in the three groups offers high convergent validity and 
reliability indices (>.70, R2>.50, α>.70, CRC>.70 and AVE>.50). It can therefore be concluded 
that there is a higher-order construct called ‘Governance practices’ with two first-order dimensions 
(control and collegial governance practices) for people in academic leader, professional services 
and professional services leader roles. Again, the results of our data analyses so far, support the 
existence of a moderating effect of employment roles as suggested in our hypotheses.  
 
Structural Models 
Before testing our hypotheses, we analyzed the extent to which our endogenous variable well-being 
was directly being affected by our control variables, the different employment roles and the two sets 
of governance practices. We conduct these analyses with three different structural models. Table C 
presents the goodness-of-fit indexes and the main parameter estimates of these three structural 
models. Our first estimated model (Model_1), considers the relationship between well-being 
(positive and negative) and our control variables: Respondents’ gender, respondents’ age, 
respondents’ employment contract and respondents’ university peer group. This model shows a 
reasonable fit (Model_1: χ2 [32]=97.50, RMSEA=.05, SRMR=.02 and CFI=.98), but the 
percentages of explained variance are very small in both endogenous variables (2% for vitality or 
positive well-being and 2% for stress or negative well-being). Regarding positive well-being, only 
respondents’ age appears to have a positive and significant effect (βAGE→PW=.09; p <.05). This result 
suggests that older individuals have higher levels of well-being. Regarding negative well-being, 
respondents’ gender has a positive and significant effect (βFEMALE→NW=.08; p <.05), which suggests 
that women experience higher levels of stress than men.  
 
In our second structural model (Model_2), we add to the original model the different employment 
roles as exogenous variables. We establish ‘Academic roles’ as our base group. This model shows a 
reasonable fit as presented in Table C (Model_2: χ2 [41]=110.74, RMSEA=.04, SRMR=.01 and 
CFI=.98). The percentages of explained variance of positive well-being and negative well-being are 
15% and 9%, respectively. The increments in R
2
 of Model_2 in relation to Model_1 are significant 
(∆R2PW =.13 and ∆R
2
NW =.07 p<.01). None of the control variables in Model_2 appear to influence 
positive well-being. In terms of negative well-being, respondent’s gender shows a positive and 
significant effect (βFEMALE→NW=.09; p <.05). In this model, employment role also has an effect on 
well-being. In particular, people in leadership roles show greater positive well-being than people in 
academic roles (βACL→PW=.32; p<.01; βPSL→PW=.24; p<.01). Regarding negative well-being, people 
in academic roles are the ones that more stress experience (βACL→NW=-.17, βPS→NW =-.17 and 
βPSL→NW =-.19; p<.01). 
 
In our third structural model (Model_3), we add to the variables in Model_2 control and collegial 
governance practices. As presented in Table C, our analysis shows that the model fits the data 
reasonably well (Model_3: χ2 [145]=355.54, RMSEA=.04, SRMR=.02 and CFI=.97). The 
increments in R
2
 of Model_3 in relation to Model_2 are also significant (∆R2PW =.26 and ∆R
2
 NW 
=.10 p<.01). Like in Model_2, none of the control variables have a significant effect on positive 
well-being. However, respondent’s gender, as it occurred in Model_2, does have a positive and 
significant effect on negative well-being (βFEMALE→NW=.07; p <.05). The coefficients of our 
employment role variables decrease when the governance practices variables are introduced, but 
they do not change their sign or significance (βACL→PW=.10; p<.01, βPSL→PW=.06; p<.05, βACL→NW=-
.05; p<.10, βPS→NW=-.07; p<.05 and βPSL→NW=-.08; p<.05). In parallel, the results of Model_3 show 
that the use of control governance practices does not seem to relate to people’s sense of vitality or 
 
47 
positive well-being (βControl→PW= -.01; p>.10), but it does relate to the level of stress or negative 
well-being they experience (βControl→NW=.10; p<.01). On the other hand, when people perceive the 
use of collegial governance, they also experience high levels of vitality (βCollegial→PW=.58; p<.01) 
and low levels of stress (βCollegial→NW= -.39; p<.01). 
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TABLE A: Descriptive statistics across groups of employment roles 
 Academic  Academic Leader 
Professionals  
Services  
Professional 
Services Leader 
 
ANOVA 
Duncan-Test 
Differences 
 
Mean  
 
AC
 
Mean  
ACL
 
Mean  
PS
 
Mean 
PSL
 
 
Control Governance        
CON1 
My institution uses specific performance indicators to monitor 
performance 
4.64 5.45 4.68 5.42 
 
13.06*** AC=PSMS < PL=ACL 
CON2 
My institution sets specific performance targets to differentiate good and 
bad performance 
4.25 4.79 4.17 5.06 
 
8.23*** PSMS=AC < ACL=PSL 
CON3 
In my institution, rewards are based on whether you meet the objectives 
set by supervisors  
3.56 4.27 3.54 4.33 
 
10.47*** PSMS=AC < ACL=PSL 
CON4 My institution monitors what people do and don't do 4.47 4.57 4.08 4.57  3.18** PSMS=AC AC=ACL=PSL 
Collegial Governance        
COL1 
My institution develops its strategic plans following a thorough 
consultation process 
2.93 4.93 4.23 5.34 
 
83.28*** AC <PSMS <ACL= PSL 
COL2 
My institution is effective at communicating how the work of individuals 
and teams contributes to its overall success 
2.73 4.11 3.49 4.22 
 
43.05*** AC <PSMS <ACL= PSL 
COL3 
My institution provides us with the necessary resources to do our work 
well 
2.95 4.51 3.75 4.75 
 
51.03*** AC <PSMS <ACL= PSL 
COL4 
My institution equally promotes and recognizes excellence in whatever 
shape or form it comes (e.g., teaching, research, 
management/administration) 
2.77 4.48 3.64 4.77 
 
58.27*** AC <PSMS <ACL= PSL 
COL5 
My institution provides constant opportunities for learning and 
development 
3.92 5.16 4.65 5.20 
 
31.68*** AC <PSMS <ACL= PSL 
COL6 
In my institution staff have a lot of autonomy to choose how they meet 
their output goals in whatever way they think is best 
3.71 4.43 4.26 4.72 
 
14.69*** AC <PSMS <ACL= PSL 
Positive Well-being        
PWB1 I feel alive and vital at work 3.90 5.45 3.85 5.66  45.95*** PSMS=AC<ACL=PSL 
PWB2 I have energy and spirit at work 4.22 5.71 4.19 5.73  41.75*** PSMS=AC < ACL= PSL 
PWB3 I feel alert and awake at work 4.57 5.78 4.42 5.77  35.77*** PSMS=AC < PSL=ACL 
PWB4 I am looking forward to each new day at work 3.55 5.09 3.63 5.09  39.43*** PSMS=AC < PSL=ACL 
Negative Well-being        
NWB1 I feel stressed at work 5.15 4.31 4.53 3.86  21.05*** PSL <ACL= PSMS < AC 
*** p < .001; ** p < .05; * p < .10 
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TABLE B: Results of the measurement models across groups of employment roles 
 Total Sample Academic (AC) Academic Leader (ACL) Professionals Services (PS) Professional Services Leader (PSL) 
 Complete M. M. Reduced M. M. Complete M. M. Reduced M. M. Complete M. M. Reduced M. M. Complete M. M. Reduced M. M. Complete M. M. Reduced M. M. 
 * R2 R. * R2 R. * R2 R. * R2 R. * R2 R. * R2 R. * R2 R. * R2 R. * R2 R. * R2 R. 
Control 
Governance 
                              
CON1 .82 .67 .68 .90 .81 .83 .76 .58 .68 .94 .79 .82 .84 .71 .70 .81 .66 .79 .83 .69 .67 .87 .76 .83 .84 .71 .48 .86 .74 .90 
CON2 .87 .76 .60 .79 .62 .85 .92 .85 .60 .75 .79 .85 .77 .59 .61 .80 .64 .81 .85 .72 .59 .82 .67 .85 .97 .94 .53 .95 .90 .91 
CON3 .41 .17 .42   .72 .39 .15 .42   .79 .41 .17 .41   .65 .41 .17 .41   .71 .19 .04 .42   .82 
CON4 .30 .09     .34 .12     .41 .17     .26 .07     .12 .01     
Collegial 
Governance 
             
  
 
  
       
  
 
  
COL1 .78 .61 .88 .77 .59 .89 .75 .56 .87 .74 .55 .87 .77 .59 .84 .76 .58 .87 .70 .49 .83 .70 .49 .85 .61 .37 .84 .61 .37 .86 
COL2 .81 .66 .74 .81 .66 .78 .77 .59 .72 .78 .61 .75 .81 .66 .68 .81 .66 .76 .79 .62 .67 .80 .64 .74 .76 .58 .68 .76 .58 .75 
COL3 .81 .66 .56 .80 .64 .61 .78 .61 .53 .77 .59 .57 .79 .62 .50 .79 .62 .58 .70 .49 .47 .70 .49 .56 .87 .76 .49 .86 .74 .57 
COL4 .83 .69  .83 .69  .79 .62  .80 .64  .74 .55  .74 .55  .82 .67  .83 .69  .81 .66  .82 .67  
COL5 .71 .50  .70 .49  .67 .45  .68 .46  .69 .48  .69 .48  .66 .44  .69 .48  .69 .48  .69 .48  
COL6 .52 .27     .58 .34     .30 .09     .34 .12     .34 .12     
Positive 
Well-being 
             
  
 
  
       
  
 
  
PWB1 .92 .85 .92 .92 .85 .90 .90 .81 .90 .90 .81 .90 .90 .81 .90 .90 .81 .90 .92 .85 .91 .92 .85 .91 .94 .88 .90 .94 .88 .90 
PWB2 .93 .86 .86 .93 .86 .86 .93 .86 .84 .93 .86 .84 .91 .83 .84 .91 .83 .84 .93 .86 .85 .93 .86 .85 .76 .58 .84 .76 .58 .84 
PWB3 .78 .61 .75 .78 .61 .75 .74 .55 .71 .74 .55 .71 .71 .50 .72 .71 .50 .72 .77 .59 .73 .77 .59 .73 .88 .77 .71 .88 .77 .71 
PWB4 .82 .67  .82 .67  .78 .61  .78 .61  .85 .72  .85 .72  .79 .62  .79 .62  .79 .62  .79 .62  
Negative 
Well-being 
                              
NWB1 1.00 - - 1.00 - - 1.00 - - 1.00 - - 1.00 - - 1.00 - - 1.00 - - 1.00 - - 1.00 - - 1.00 - - 
Goodness of 
Fit 
χ2 [85]=349.3 
RMSEA=.06 
SRMR=.06 
CFI=.96 
χ2 [49]=164.4 
RMSEA=.05 
SRMR=.03 
CFI=.98 
χ2 [85]=219.5 
RMSEA=.05 
SRMR=.06 
CFI=.96 
χ2 [49]=111.0 
RMSEA=.05 
SRMR=.03 
CFI=.98 
χ2 [85]=127.9 
RMSEA=.06 
SRMR=.07 
CFI=.95 
χ2 [49]=56.7 
RMSEA=.03  
SRMR=.04 
CFI=.99 
χ2 [85]=194.8 
RMSEA=.08 
SRMR=.06 
CFI=.93 
χ2 [49]=117.9 
RMSEA=.08 
SRMR=.05 
CFI=.95 
χ2 [85]=140.3 
RMSEA=.10 
SRMR=.09 
CFI=.87 
χ2 [49]=52.7 
RMSEA=.03  
SRMR=.07 
CFI=.98 
Correlations 
Reduced 
M.M. () 
Control 
OG 
Collegial  
OG 
Positive  
W 
Control 
OG 
Collegial  
OG 
Positive  
W 
Control 
OG 
Collegial  
OG 
Positive 
W 
Control 
OG 
Collegial  
OG 
Positive  
W 
Control 
OG 
Collegial  
OG 
Positive 
W 
Collegial OG .44***   .22***   .73***   .70***   .70***   
Positive W .28*** .60***  .07* .54***  .32*** .61***  .37*** .57***  .16 .47***  
Negative W -.07* -.39*** -.38*** .10** -.34*** -.37*** -.01 -.26*** -.40*** -.17*** -.36*** -.28*** -.01 -.11 -.20* 
*Standardized factor loadings are reported and all  are significant at *** p < .001; ** p < .05; * p < .10.  
R. Reliability of the latent variables: Cronbach’s  / CRC/ AVE are located in the R column of each group. Complete M. M.: Complete Measurement Model and Reduced M. M.: Reduced Measurement Model: without CON3, CON4 and COL6.
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TABLE C: Determinants of well-being in the total sample 
Direct Effects βModel_1 βModel_2 βModel_3 
Respondents’ gender (Female) → Positive Well-being -.04 .02 .02 
Respondents’ age → Positive Well-being .09** .02 .04 
Respondents’ employment contract (Part time) → Positive Well-being .00 .06 .05 
PG_B: All other institutions with research income of 22% or more of 
total → Positive Well-being 
.05 .04 .02 
PG_C: Institutions with research income 8-21% of total → Positive Well-
being 
.02 .01 .01 
PG_D: Institutions with research income 5 -8% of total and total income 
>£120m → Positive Well-being 
-.01 -.01 -.04 
PG_E: Teaching institutions with a turnover of £40m-£119m → Positive 
Well-being 
-.05 -.04 -.00 
PG_F: Smaller teaching institutions → Positive Well-being .05 .05 .02 
PG_G: Specialist music/arts teaching institutions → Positive Well-being .03 .02 .00 
Academic Leader → Positive Well-being  .32*** .10*** 
Professional Services Manager-Support → Positive Well-being  -.01 -.01 
Professional Services Leader → Positive Well-being  .24*** .06** 
Control Governance→ Positive Well-being    -.01 
Collegial Governance→ Positive Well-being    .58*** 
Respondents’ gender (Female) → Negative Well-being .08** .09** .07** 
Respondents’ age → Negative Well-being -.04 -.04 -.04 
Respondents’ employment contract (Part time) → Negative Well-being -.05 -.08 -.06 
PG_B: All other institutions with research income of 22% or more of 
total→ Negative Well-being 
-.02 -.02 .00 
PG_C: Institutions with research income 8-21% of total→ Negative Well-
being 
.00 .00 .00 
PG_D: Institutions with research income 5 -8% of total and total income 
>£120m → Negative Well-being 
.00 .01 .04 
PG_E: Teaching institutions with a turnover of £40m-£119m→ Negative 
Well-being 
-.05 -.04 -.02 
PG_F: Smaller teaching institutions → Negative Well-being -.08 -.09 -.06 
PG_G: Specialist music/arts teaching institutions → Negative Well-being -.00 -.02 .02 
Academic Leader → Negative Well-being  -.17*** -.05* 
Professional Services Manager-Support → Negative Well-being  -.17*** -.07** 
Professional Services Leader → Negative Well-being  -.19** -.08** 
Control Governance→ Negative Well-being   .10*** 
Collegial Governance→ Negative Well-being    -.39*** 
R2 Positive Well-being  .02 .15 .41 
R2 Negative Well-being .02 .09 .19 
β: Standardized coefficients.  
*** p < .001; ** p < .05; * p < .10. 
Respondents’ gender - group control: “Male”. 
Respondents’ employment contract - group control: “Full time”  
Employment role - group control: “Academic”.  
University Peer Group - group control: “PER_A: Russell group (excluding LSE)”.  
Model_1: χ2 [32]=97.50, RMSEA=.05, SRMR=.02 and CFI=.98. 
Model_2: χ2 [41]=110.74, RMSEA=.04, SRMR=.01 and CFI=.98. 
Extended Model: χ2 [145]=355.54, RMSEA=.04, SRMR=.02 and CFI=.97. 
 
